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Commentary

Moving Ahead on the Global Health Security Agenda
Tom Inglesby and Julie E. Fischer

O

n February 13, 2014, a new Global Health Security
(GHS) agenda was launched by more than 20
countries, in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), and the World Organisation for Animal Health
(OIE).1 This new effort aims to drive and coordinate action
among these partners, as well as the international NGO
community and the private sector, in a more dedicated
effort to prevent epidemics, detect biological threats early,
and respond rapidly. There is hope and expectation that
many more countries will join the agenda in the year ahead.
All countries are invited.
The specific objectives are organized around priority issues: antimicrobial resistance, food safety, laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, outbreaks, timely disease detection
and reporting, sample sharing, effective diagnostics, emergency operations centers, rapid response teams, and ability to
mobilize medicines and expertise during health emergencies.
What is compelling and potentially so valuable about this
effort is that it gathers, elevates, and shines a bright light on a
series of deeply important issues that do not necessarily receive the attention or the international collaborative effort
they require. The agenda broadly encourages self-examination
regarding the work that countries do on these issues, and asks
countries and nongovernmental organizations to dig deeper
and consider new commitments in the years ahead.
A review of the issues on this agenda makes clear how
serious these challenges are. And a look at who is doing
some of the leading work on these issues shows how important it will be to identify international best practices, to
form new international collaborations, and to encourage

countries from around the world to offer their expertise and
resources where they are needed.

Preventing Avoidable Epidemics
The first priority targeted in the new GHS agenda is antimicrobial resistance. In the US alone, an estimated 2
million people annually get serious infections with bacteria
resistant to one or more antibiotics, resulting in 23,000
deaths.2 Where data are available, trends in many places in
the world look similar or even more dire. It is now conceivable that multidrug antimicrobial resistance in hospitals could become so widespread that it endangers safe
surgical procedures. The GHS agenda calls for stronger
surveillance to understand emerging microbial resistance
and for better antibiotic stewardship in people and animals. In addition to what the agenda articulates, we are
going to need to develop new therapeutics and do a better
job at public communication about antibiotics. Lessons on
how to succeed will come from different parts of the world.
Scandinavian countries, for example, have substantially
lowered their antimicrobial resistance rates through coordinated national action. In Taiwan, national steps that
include public education and changed reimbursement
strategies have been employed to lower antimicrobial resistance rates.
The agenda also prioritizes the promotion of laboratory
biosafety and biosecurity. Success in this work means
equipping laboratorians with the tools, skills, and practices
needed to conduct rapid and reliable testing for dangerous
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diseases while minimizing risks to themselves and the surrounding community and preventing deliberate diversion
of pathogens. In recent years, ‘‘gain of function’’ research
that has increased transmissibility of highly lethal mammalian viruses has raised international concerns about the
consequences of such work in the event of a laboratory
accident or the deliberate misuse of the pathogen or the
knowledge of how to create it. Setting global norms around
these issues should be a priority.

look for disease outbreaks in mass gatherings are worth
broader recognition and understanding. For example, the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has developed programs
that monitor disease outbreaks in mass gatherings of travelers during annual religious pilgrimages, leading to establishment of a WHO Collaborating Center for Mass
Gathering Medicine in KSA.5 Other efforts, such as the
experience gained in the UK during extensive and systematic
monitoring for public health emergencies during the London Olympics, offer lessons that may be broadly useful.6

Detecting Threats Early
Respond Rapidly and Effectively
A central portion of the new GHS agenda is dedicated to the
early detection and reporting of new biological threats.
Timely public health surveillance requires that doctors,
nurses, and health officials recognize emerging and epidemicprone diseases and report events in time to alert their own
governments, and that governments, in turn, inform the
WHO and the global community. This sequence of events
requires clinical and scientific competence, good communication practices, and support from political leaders. China’s
ongoing reports on H7N9 influenza demonstrate the value of
detecting threats early and communicating rapidly and
transparently. China’s discovery of the virus and its frequent
communications on investigation and control measures have
allowed the global community to share information in real
time—an advantage in predicting the risks that the disease
might spread (as well as in building trust across international
communities of practice).
Training programs like the US CDC’s Field Epidemiology Training Program have successfully trained more
than 2,800 epidemiologists in more than 40 countries to
detect and respond quickly to epidemics.3 Key elements of
early detection also include diagnostic tools and highly
dependable laboratories. Stakeholders as diverse as PATH,
the Gates Foundation, and the US Department of Defense
have supported development of point-of-care diagnostics
and laboratory capacity-building strategies based on local
field conditions, offering great potential to help in other
settings. Governments and NGOs have also partnered to
demonstrate the feasibility of cross-border disease surveillance networks such as Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance
(MBDS), EARS-Net, CORDS, and the East African Integrated Disease Surveillance Network (EAIDSNet).
The sharing of pathogen samples at the start of and
throughout an outbreak is important to keep the global
community informed and to allow scientific understanding
to deepen and evolve. How best to accomplish this remains
deeply contentious. Adapting relevant principles from
WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework4 as a
foundation for a framework with wide global consensus on
pathogen sharing would be a sensible way to move forward.
The movement of people around the world and the
gathering of large numbers for special events pose particular
disease surveillance challenges. Special surveillance efforts to
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Detection of emerging public health threats is only the first
step. To prevent the spread of disease to vulnerable populations, reports of priority diseases should trigger immediate action by personnel with the training, equipment, and
resources to investigate and contain outbreaks. Managing
cases and preventing the further spread of disease may require extensive coordination—not only among clinical and
public health personnel, but with partners in animal health,
environmental health, and public safety and services.
Many countries face serious challenges in coordinating
this multisectoral response to public health events. The GHS
agenda emphasizes the importance of establishing emergency operations centers where health leaders can collect
information from multiple sources, coordinate decision
making, communicate across levels and sectors, and mobilize
rapid response teams and resources—including materials
and expertise offered by international partners when needed.
Uganda’s experiences in coping with Ebola virus outbreaks illustrate the importance of such coordination.
Ebola virus outbreaks in 2000 and 2007 resulted in hundreds of cases and deaths over weeks, with transmission in
hospitals leading to cases among healthcare workers and the
community before national and international partners
could get training, materials, and equipment into place for
case management and infection control. In 2011, when a
newly established reference laboratory created in partnership with CDC confirmed a single case of Ebola virus infection, Ugandan officials mobilized a rapid response team
that integrated national and international partners in a
coordinated effort, moving the necessary personnel and
resources to the community level within 1 day.7

Discussion
The GHS agenda should provide momentum to move
forward with the revised International Health Regulations
(IHR), a legally binding agreement among 196 States
Parties to protect against the international spread of disease
with WHO coordination. The success of IHR depends on
national capacities to detect, assess, report, and respond to
public health events before they cross borders. Only 40
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States Parties reported achieving the required core capacities by the target date of June 2012.
One of the challenges in helping the 118 additional
countries that requested and received a 2-year extension to
implement IHR action plans lies in the scope of the
agreement. WHO has developed guidance to help national officials define and monitor progress, which requires
strengthening public health surveillance and response systems
nationwide, as well as at points of entry. Self-assessment tools
focus on high-level attributes and indicators—useful in
providing flexibility for every country context, but difficult to
package for domestic and international funders seeking immediately measurable outcomes. Major bilateral donors have
begun working with partner nations to build IHR capacities
in areas such as safe and reliable laboratory testing, but serious
gaps remain, and countries will face challenges in sustaining
their gains after the final IHR reporting deadline in June
2016.
The GHS agenda can help lead to more substantial national commitments to these issues, more unity of purpose in
the NGO community, and more financial support from
governments and foundations As governments and NGOs
become more dedicated to these issues, the results should be a
global community more capable of avoiding the preventable
spread of infectious disease, of detecting epidemics earlier,
and of responding much more effectively to outbreaks.
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